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3.1  Introduction 
In  1884, slightly over 10 percent of  the total federal civilian  labor force 
of  131,208 were within the classified or competitive service (U.S. House of 
Representatives  1976, 305). By  1921, however, the federal labor force was 
much larger, with 562,252 employees, and 80 percent were in the classified 
civil service. In this chapter, we examine the extension of the merit service to 
most federal civilian employees, the granting of job tenure, and the adoption 
of  requirements for political  neutrality. We  show that the expansion  of  the 
meht system was due principally to actions of the president, as authorized by 
the Pendleton Act (22 Stat. 403), although there was general support in Con- 
gress. The central role of the president is consistent with the arguments that 
we developed in chapter 2. Not only was the president the most national of  all 
politicians and, thereby, the most likely to be identified by angry voters with 
patronage and poor performance by  federal workers, but controlling the size 
of the patronage pool was necessary to allow the president to maximize the 
returns from trading patronage appointments with members of Congress for 
support on policy issues. 
Additionally, we argue that provisions in the civil service system for job 
tenure and political  neutrality, added gradually  after the Pendleton Act was 
passed, were directed efforts by the president and the Congress to reduce costly 
competition over and manipulation of classified federal employees. Recall that, 
when the Pendleton Act was passed, the immediate concern of the president 
and the Congress was to weaken the authority of local party officials and to 
reduce the costs of ensuring that the growing federal labor force was respon- 
sive to the demands of  influential constituents for government services. The 
structure of the new civil service that formally partitioned the labor force be- 
tween patronage and merit employees responded to that initial concern. Once 
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the civil service was established, however, problems arose because members 
of  Congress sought control over federal employees. Demands were made on 
classified workers to engage in partisan activities under threat of  dismissal. 
Additionally, pressures were placed on the president to declassify merit posi- 
tions, returning them to the spoils system and direct use by politicians. In order 
to maintain the benefits of the new institutional structure put into place by the 
Pendleton Act, job-tenure guarantees and requirements for political neutrality 
were incorporated into civil service rules. 
Through the process of extending the merit system to nonclassified employ- 
ees and incremental adjustments in the civil service system, the move  away 
from patronage was made more and more complete. While patronage employ- 
ees were assets who facilitated political exchange, under the emerging civil 
service system federal workers were removed gradually from the competitive, 
political arena. By  1940, as a result of  this process of incremental institution 
building, the federal civilian workforce could not be hired or fired at the will 
of  politicians, nor could it be used explicitly to promote political campaigns. 
In fewer than sixty years, the conversion from the old patronage system to an 
insulated, ostensibly politically neutral civil service was achieved. 
As we discussed in chapter 2, the notion that the inauguration and extension 
of the civil service system were in the interest of vote-maximizing federal poli- 
ticians contrasts with more standard views of the origins of the classified ser- 
vice.’ In  addition to stressing the role of  reformists, these views emphasize 
immediate political considerations-the  desire of Republicans, first, to placate 
reformers and to deny Democrats access to the spoils after the election of 1884 
and, second, to “blanket in” the party faithful in their federal jobs, following 
the defeat of the incumbent president.*  If these purely partisan goals had been 
the primary forces behind the Pendleton Act, then nothing much would have 
come of  it. Had the subsequent expansion of  patronage been of  significant 
value to the president or to a substantial majority of the members of Congress, 
then repeal of the Pendleton Act or a general declassification of merit positions 
would have been  likely, whenever either political party dominated both the 
White House and the Congress. But this did not happen. Efforts to repeal the 
Pendleton  Act, especially in  1886, met with bipartisan resistance. Instead, 
the merit system was expanded and its provisions broadened. Hence, there was 
more at stake for federal politicians in extending the merit system than merely 
limiting the access of their political competitors to the spoils. 
The president, in particular, had an interest in  controlling the size of  the 
patronage workforce. Not only did he suffer because of a lack of performance 
by patronage workers, but, as shown in appendix B, he also had an incentive 
to manage the number of patronage workers in order to enhance their value. In 
general, Congress was supportive. Even so, the position of members of  Con- 
gress on the issue was more complex than that of  the president. The prefer- 
ences of members of the Congress on the optimal number of appointees could 
be expected to vary, sometimes substantially. For example, preferences were 50  Chapter3 
likely to differ along party lines. The Constitution granted the president ap- 
pointment power, and delegation of appointments by the president to members 
of Congress in exchange for support on legislation was usually restricted  to 
members of the president’s party. As Senator Pendleton stated during the de- 
bate over civil service reform, “The Republican party has at this time, in round 
numbers,  110,000 officers and employees under their control, and there are 
scarcely any Democrats. When I have presented at one of the Departments the 
name of a person from my State for appointment, the first question which I am 
most frequently met is, ‘Is he a Democrat?’ If so, that seals his fate of course” 
(Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess.,  11 December 1882, p. 173). 
Even as Congress in general desired limits on the growth of patronage after 
the Civil War, the phrase “to the victor go the spoils” suggests that support for 
restrictions on patronage at any point in time would vary between those whose 
party occupied the White House, the “ins,” and those whose party did not, the 
 out^."^ The House vote on the Pendleton Act, examined in chapter 2, shows 
the importance of the underlying pressures for civil service reform, with mem- 
bers whose districts had large customhouses or post offices voting in favor of 
the bill. Nevertheless, expecting to win congressional elections and the presi- 
dency in 1884, Democrats were more likely to have voted against the act than 
were  republican^.^ After considering the effects of federal installations and 
other factors, it is likely that many Democrats did not want the limits on patron- 
age authorized by the Pendleton Act until they had an opportunity to remove 
Republicans  and to replace them with members of their own party. On the 
other hand, had Democrats not expected to win in the upcoming election, they 
might have desired even greater restrictions on patronage in order to limit the 
range of political appointments and assessments available to Republicans. Ac- 
cordingly, controlling for expectations regarding success in future elections, it 
seems likely that congressional members from the president’s party would be 
the demanders of  patronage while those from the opposition would be more 
interested in restricting it. Moreover, within the president’s party, it is likely 
that the majority of congressional members would prefer that a greater number 
of patronage positions be made available and the president fewer since he had 
to manage the overall patronage pool and therefore internalized more of the 
costs of patronage. 
Although each member of Congress could be expected to compare the costs 
and benefits of expanding patronage, strict vote-maximizing behavior suggests 
that not all the costs of patronage would be internalized. Any scandal or ineffi- 
ciency due to the actions of federal patronage workers would be more associ- 
ated with the president than with individual members of Congress. As a conse- 
quence, we expect that the president would often be at odds with members of 
Congress from the  same party  over the size of  the patronage pool  and how 
coverage should be expanded in response to the growth of  the federal labor 
force. 
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with patronage in the post-Civil  War period. Clearly, the Pendleton  Act of 
1883  provided some relief, as it outlined a framework for improving the perfor- 
mance of federal employees and for making them less attractive targets for 
political  manipulation.  The act also established  a  bipartisan  Civil  Service 
Commission, its three commissioners (only two could be from the same party) 
appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate. The commission was 
authorized to select a chief examiner and establish local boards for drafting and 
administering exams for the classified service. The boards were to forward the 
names of those who passed with the highest scores to agencies for selection. 
Under the “Rule of Three,” the three applicants who performed best were sent 
to the appointment  officer for c~nsideration.~  The early exams tested  basic 
practical knowledge, and 58 percent of those tested in  1884 achieved the re- 
quired  passing  rate of 65 percent (U. S. Civil Service Commission, Annual 
Report, 1884, 67). With selection based more on merit than on base political 
considerations,  members of the classified service could devote more time to 
providing government services than to performing duties for the party and po- 
litical benefactors. 
Despite these initial changes, the separation of classified employees from 
partisan  activities was not complete. Classified  employees remained  free to 
participate in political campaigns and to make voluntary contributions. These 
employees were still of value to local politicians and members of Congress, 
and there remained ample ground  for costly competition  among politicians 
over their control and use. As before, those members of Congress who particu- 
larly  valued  the classified  service could not  withdraw  unilaterally  from the 
competition for federal workers. The positions would be secured by those who 
remained active in the spoils system, unless they were denied to all. In addition, 
as the size of the classified labor force grew relative to the number of patronage 
positions, the pressure on the president by party members to declassify merit 
employees increased. If the president had routinely caved in to such demands, 
the survival of the merit service would have been put into question. Moreover, 
the ability of the president to limit the number of patronage workers would 
have been weakened. To preserve the advantages offered by the merit service, 
both tenure provisions to reduce the use of threats of dismissal as a means of 
manipulation  and requirements for political neutrality to reduce the value of 
federal employees for partisan purposes were gradually incorporated into civil 
service rules through actions of the president and the Congress. 
Job tenure became a critical element for removing federal employees from 
the competitive political arena. Tenure had nor  been granted to members of 
the new classified service by the Pendleton Act: “This bill does not touch the 
questions of tenure of office, or removals from office, except that removals 
shall not be made for refusing to pay political assessments or to perform parti- 
san service. It leaves both where it finds them” (US.  Senate, “Report,”  1882, 
ix). In part, the absence of tenure provisions in the law was due to a desire of 
members of Congress to avoid the formation of an “elite” civil service. Past 52  Chapter3 
government positions that had been filled through patronage had been tempo- 
rary ones.6  Hence, initially under the Pendleton Act, the employment of classi- 
fied workers remained subject to the wishes of the president and their supervi- 
sors. An  individual’s position could be declassified, merit workers could be 
fired, and appeals were limited. 
It soon became obvious to the president, however, that at least some tenure 
protections were necessary to reduce the pressures to expand patronage. With- 
out provisions for limited job security, positions could be removed from the 
classified service by  the president and returned to patronage. The ability to 
discharge employees so readily invited constant demands to declassify posi- 
tions, especially following a change in the party controlling the White House. 
With newly acquired access to appointments, members of Congress with pent- 
up demand for patronage called for the removal of previous classified workers 
in order to respond to the claims of their constituents. 
Congress also had another reason for providing some form of job security 
to classified employees. The president, cabinet members, and agency heads 
had more direct access to classified workers in the executive branch than did 
most members of Congress. As such, merit workers could be pressured by their 
supervisors to respond to the desires of  the administration under penalty of 
removal, even if those actions were opposed by Congress. Hence, job security 
would also serve to limit manipulation of classified employees by the president. 
Once adopted, however, tenure provisions represented a marked change in the 
organization of the federal labor force from previous patronage practices. 
An  additional requirement for limiting costly competition over federal em- 
ployees that represented another major change from patronage was political 
neutiality. To  further reduce the incentive of  politicians to compete for and 
manipulate classified federal workers and to allow them to focus on the provi- 
sion of federal government services, political neutrality became a sought-after 
attribute for the civil service system. In 1907, civil service rules were explicitly 
expanded to prohibit classified employees from taking an active part in politi- 
cal  campaign^.^ With the passage of the first Hatch Act in 1939, this prohibi- 
tion was extended to all rank-and-file federal workers, whether or not they 
were in the classified service. The broad coverage mandated by the Hatch Act 
was in response to problems that arose in controlling the political activities of 
patronage workers and their supervisors following a substantial expansion of 
patronage positions by the Roosevelt administration in the early 1930s. A di- 
rective that federal employees be neutral parties, impartial suppliers of federal 
services,  and  not  directly  involved  in  political  campaigns  was  a  notion 
that could not  have  been  anticipated by  Jacksonian politicians prior to the 
Civil War. 
3.2  Efforts to Repeal the Pendleton Act 
If short-term partisan considerations had been dominant in the enactment of 
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after a change in the party that controlled the presidency and the Congress, to 
allow for the expansion of patronage. When the Democrats won control of the 
House in 1886, there was considerable pressure on President Cleveland from 
party members to provide patronage jobs to reward their victory. As part of 
that movement, Senator Zebulon Vance, a Democrat from North Carolina, in- 
troduced a bill (S. 839) in January 1886 to repeal the Pendleton Act.8 Vance 
charged that the Pendleton Act had been passed by Republicans to “perpetuate 
the official existence of  [that party’s] friends” in their government jobs (Con- 
gressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 31 March 1886, p. 2945). Vance ar- 
gued that the law restricted the prerogatives of the new administration and that 
it weakened the party that was the vehicle for promoting the popular will. Ev- 
ery citizen was qualified, according to Vance, to hold any office: “There are 
one million American citizens competent to fill it [a vacant office]. Each has 
the right to apply for it equal in law to the right of any other man. Each has the 
right to go directly, without hindrance, to the appointing power. But the civil- 
service law says, not so: no one shall be appointed, no one’s application shall 
be considered” (Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 31 March 1886, 
p. 2946). 
Through repeal of  the Pendleton Act, Vance wanted to return the federal 
civil service to patronage and hence open it to Democratic nominees. The re- 
peal, however, was defeated on  18 June 1886 by  a bipartisan vote of  33 to 6 
(with thirty-seven abstentions) in the Senate. Thirty-one percent of the Demo- 
crats and 59 percent of the Republicans voted against the repeal; only 14 per- 
cent of the Republicans voted against the repeal; only 14 percent of the Demo- 
crats voted for it.9 Even though Vance framed his bill as an effort to support 
Democrats in federal jobs, most of his Democratic colleagues failed to vote 
for the return of patronage. Republicans regained the White House and control 
of Congress in the elections of  1888, and the Democrats did so after the 1892 
elections. Nevertheless, in these and other cases of  one-party domination of 
both branches of  government, when repeal of  the Pendleton Act might have 
been possible, no serious efforts were initiated. While there were eight addi- 
tional bills, sponsored by both Republicans and Democrats, introduced to re- 
peal the Pendleton Act, none made it out of committee (Sageser 1935, 164). 
Most of the lingering opposition to the classified service came, not from fed- 
eral politicians, but from low-level party officials, who were most affected by 
the loss of patronage (U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report,  1886, 
20,60-61). 
3.3  The President and the Extension of the Merit Service 
3.3.1  Extension of the Classified Civil Service 
The failure of efforts to repeal the Pendleton Act is important evidence be- 
cause it shows that, collectively, members of Congress supported the concept 
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and its narrow partisan  uses.  Yet,  to varying degrees, each member had an 
incentive to continue to obtain and distribute patronage appointments while 
constraining similar actions by others. On the other hand, with the broadest 
national constituencies, with the most remote ties to local party machines, and 
as the most likely to be judged by voters for the overall performance of govern- 
ment, the president was in less of a position to free ride on the patronage sys- 
tem in the ways available to individual members of Congress. Accordingly, he 
should be the most avid supporter of the merit system and take a lead in ex- 
tending it. The motives of the president in expanding the merit system to con- 
fine the size of the patronage pool are outlined in appendix B. 
As a group, the Congress also had an incentive to expand the merit system 
in response to the growth of the federal labor force. For those who were mem- 
bers of the president's party, there was the continuing problem of managing the 
actions of patronage workers and local party officials in providing government 
services. Without at least a commensurate increase in the number of  merit 
employees as the federal labor force grew, the patronage portion would have 
increased, intensifying the problems of control. 
To extend the merit service, Congress would desire a relatively uncontrover- 
sial mechanism. One option was to grant the Civil Service Commission the 
authority to extend merit classifications to patronage positions. Another was to 
vote on the size of the merit service periodically. Neither of these options was 
adopted. Congress was reluctant to give the Civil Service Commission the au- 
thority to control the number of patronage positions. Disagreements between 
the commission and the Congress would have invited denials of funding and 
threatened  the administration  of the entire merit  service. Periodic congres- 
sional votes on coverage had the risk of inviting pressure from local party offi- 
cials to expand patronage. Moreover, if the opposition party controlled both 
houses of Congress, the outcome could have resulted in less patronage being 
made available than was desired by  the president, inviting a veto. A third op- 
tion, which avoided these conflicts, was to provide for the automatic expansion 
of the classified system as the federal labor force grew. Indeed, section 6 of the 
Pendleton Act required that positions in the customs and postal services be 
added to the classified service whenever a facility reached a staff size of fifty. 
In 1894, employees in customhouses and post offices with staffs of twenty or 
greater were added to the classified service, and the limit was further reduced 
to include customhouses with staffs of five in 1896 (U.S. Civil Service Com- 
mission, Annual Reports, 1894,233, and 1897, 16-19). 
Congress, however, through a provision of the Pendleton Act, relied on an- 
other method for extending the merit service. The primary solution adopted by 
Congress to the problem of determining the size of the patronage pool in the 
face of changing conditions was to assign authority to extend the merit system 
to the president.'O Section 6 of the Pendleton Act gave the president the author- 
ity to classify positions within the executive department through executive or- 
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The granting of authority to expand the classified service to the president 
appears to have been a cost-effective measure. At any point in time, congres- 
sional action to extend merit classification to a particular class of positions was 
likely to have involved partisan debate and resistance. Although the merit sys- 
tem provided group benefits, individual members of Congress were under pres- 
sure to deliver patronage assignments to their supporters. Moreover, given ex- 
pectations  regarding  winning  the  presidential  election,  some  members  of 
Congress would have incentives to resist new merit classifications in order to 
have access to patronage should their candidate be successful. Assigning au- 
thority to the president to extend the classified service avoided these conten- 
tious debates and allowed for controls on the number of patronage employees. 
Further, the delegation of  classification authority served to preserve the im- 
plicit agreement in the Pendleton Act to limit congressional competition over 
obtaining patronage."  So long as the president's preferences were relatively 
close to that of the median member in Congress, the legislation would be pre- 
served and conflict over the amount of patronage reduced. 
The concern about potential congressional conflict over the expansion  of 
merit classification was likely tied to the close balance that existed between 
the political parties at the time that the Pendleton Act was enacted in January 
1883. The Senate was evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, 
with the Republicans holding a slight advantage in the House.'2  Because of the 
results of  the 1882 elections, it was known that the advantage in the House 
would shift to the Democrats in the next session of Congress and that the Re- 
publicans would have a two-seat advantage in the Senate. In the face of this 
balance in Congress and the uncertainty as to which party would occupy the 
White House'after the elections of  1884, neither political party was interested 
in doing away with patronage entirely. After the presidential election, when it 
was clear as to who had won the White House, members of Congress from the 
in-coming president's party would most likely prefer an expansion of patron- 
age. But the president, who had broader concerns, was likely to resist those de- 
mand~.'~ 
Once having given the president the authority to expand the merit system, 
members of Congress would be expected to act in their own self-interest and 
to seek selective increases in patronage. Because certain members of Congress 
benefited relatively more from patronage than did the president, the extension 
of the merit system through executive orders would not always go smoothly, 
and there would be demands on the president for declassification. Despite these 
pressures and the associated costs of bargaining with the Congress over the 
number of patronage workers, the president was motivated to take the lead in 
promoting the merit system and, thereby, limiting patronage. Indeed, it was not 
until  1935 that Congress passed legislation to add any significant number of 
positions to the classified service.I4 As shown in table 3.1, nearly 65 percent 
of the growth of the merit service between 1884 and 1903 was through execu- 
tive orders by the president, with the remainder due to agency growth.15 56  Chapter3 
In classifying positions, the president had to balance political benefits and 
costs. Patronage assignments, especially to the numerous fourth-class post- 
masterships (76,000 in 1896), remained valuable political assets (Skowronek 
1982,72). Fourth-class postmasterships were part-time positions in almost ev- 
ery town and village in the country, and giving them to political supporters 
throughout the politician’s district was an effective way of rewarding those who 
had contributed to campaigns. Since the duties of  fourth-class postmasters 
were limited, the risks of charges of scandal, ineptness, or lack of attention to 
which the postmasters’ patrons would be exposed were slight. The control of 
these positions was therefore strongly desired by  members of  Congress. 
The political pressures placed on each president by party officials for access 
to the spoils are illustrated by the experiences of the Cleveland, Harrison, Mc- 
Kinley, and Wilson administrations, which represented changes in  the party 
controlling the White House. When Cleveland took office in 1885, it was the 
first time that the Democrats had captured the presidency in twenty-five years. 
With such a long dry spell, Democratic members of Congress and local party 
officials were naturally anxious to secure the patronage positions so long held 
by  Republicans (Fowler 1943, 192). Since at that time the classified service 
was such a small portion of the overall federal labor force, it was little affected 
by the reallocation of the spoils. Nevertheless, Cleveland had to ward off de- 
mands from members of Congress to make some of the existing classifed posi- 
tions, as well as patronage appointments, available to Democrats. There was a 
near revolt among the Democratic ranks at Cleveland’s refusal to dump Repub- 
lican  officeholders and  replace  them  with  Democratic stalwarts  (Sageser 
The time costs for the president in reviewing the hoards of  office seekers 
were great: “Secretary of State Thomas F.  Bayard reported on March 13, 1885, 
that the crowds of  office-seekers were greater than in 1881. . . . No President 
since the Civil War had ever given such close personal attention to the applica- 
tions for appointments” (Sageser 1935,84). Cleveland found these pressures a 
burden and a diversion from public affairs that needed consideration. He also 
assured the National Civil Service Reform League that  the Pendleton Act 
would be enforced, that Republicans in the classified service would not be 
removed, and that Democrats would not be added to the ranks purely for parti- 
san reasons (Sageser 1935,79-83). 
During Cleveland’s first administration, the size of  the classified service 
more than doubled through executive orders and the growth of  facilities al- 
ready covered by provisions of the Pendleton Act. The largest addition was the 
classification of  the Railway Mail Service by  executive order, which added 
5,320 positions to the classifed service. The Railway Mail Service was a hot- 
bed of political scandal that embarrassed the president (Sageser 1935, 104-7). 
When the Republican Harrison took office in  1889, the party was  ready to 
reassert control over appointments, but, as with Cleveland, Harrison resisted. 
He declared that he would review the recommendations and require that each 
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office seeker demonstrate efficiency in the discharge of official duties. He also 
stressed that  he would enforce the Pendleton Act  and extend  its coverage 
(Sageser 1935, 130-31). 
The demands on Congress also were severe: “Hordes of men streamed to 
the capital, and, seeking out their Senators or Representatives, they pressed for 
rewards. . . . Local pressure was strong. . . . Cabinet offices were so crowded 
with Senators, congressmen, and their secretaries that it was impossible to get 
anybody’s attention on a business matter” (Sageser 1935,132-33). In response, 
Congress attempted to gain more control over the allocation of patronage by 
withholding appropriations for the Civil Service Commission from time to 
time. Even so, as indicated in table 3.1, the classified service grew by  39 per- 
cent  during  Harrison’s  administration, and  82 percent  of  the  growth  was 
through executive orders in agencies, such as the Indian Service, the Fish Com- 
mission, and Weather Bureau, and 548 free delivery post offices with 7,610 
positions (Sageser 1935, 158-62;  Skowronek 1982,70-71). 
Similar pressures were exerted on President Cleveland during his second 
term in office. In the Congress, the Democrats demanded that the White House 
remove additions to the classifed service made by the previous administration. 
Indeed, Cleveland commented that his party members were “heedless of the 
burdens and responsibilities of  the incoming administration and of  the duty 
our party owes to the people” (quoted in Sageser 1935, 185). Through execu- 
tive orders between 1894 and 1896, Cleveland added 10,396 positions in the 
Indian Service, the Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, and the Post Of- 
fice, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Government Printing Office as well 
as creating other merit positions. Moreover, through a revision of civil service 
rules approved by the president, 27,052 positions were added in the Treasury, 
Interior, and War Departments (Skowronek 1982,70-71;  Sageser 1935, 197- 
200). By  the end of Cleveland’s second administration, the classified service 
covered over 45 percent of all federal civilian positions, reducing the available 
patronage slots. This meant that, when McKinley took office, there was to be 
more serious pressure from Republican politicians for declassification, and 
McKinley did remove 9,185 of the positions added by Cleveland (Skowronek 
1982,71; Sageser 1935,217-20). Despite this, the overall number of classified 
positions actually grew by  10,361 during McKinley’s administration to 97,405, 
including 1,7  15 added through executive order. From McKinley’s assassination 
in 1901 to the end of his second term in 1903, the presidency was assumed by 
Theodore Roosevelt, under whom 8,391 positions were added in the Rural 
Free Delivery Service and other departments through executive orders and 
rules revisions. By the end of  1903, the classified service included 108,000 
positions, out of a total civilian federal labor force of 301,000 (See U. S.  House 
of Representatives 1976, 305; and table 3.1). 
When Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency in  1913, the Democrats 
had been without access to the spoils since 1897. Although the number of 
classified positions had grown by 225 percent from 87,044 in 1897 to 282,597 58  Chapter3 
Table 3.1  Sources of Growth of the Classified Service, 1884-1913 
President 
Classified  Federal Civilian 
Service  Employment 
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Cleveland (D), 1893-97: 
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282,597  469,879 
Sources and notes: Classified Service data for the Arthur, Cleveland, McKinley, and first Roosevelt 
administrations are from Sageser (1935, 68, 107, 162, 199,231) and Skowronek (1982,70-71). 
For the second Roosevelt and Taft administrations, the data are from US. House of Representa- 
tives (1976, 207, 213). The data through the first Roosevelt administration represent the size of 
the classified service due to executive orders, agency growth, and congressional acts as of March 
1885, 1889, 1893, 1897, 1901, and  1903. The totals are the sums from each of  the categories. 
Since these totals represent March data for the last year that the president was in office, they differ 
slightly from those provided for the end of the year in U.S.  House of Representatives (1976,305), 
which are as follows:  1885,  15, 590;  1889, 29,650;  1897, 85,886; 1901, 106,205; and 1903, 
135,453. March totals for the classified service and agency growth data are not available for the 
second Roosevelt administration or for McKinley. For those two administrations, the totals are for 
the end of the year as provided by  U.S. House of Representatives (1976, 305): 1909, 234,940; 59  The Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees 
Table 3.1  (continued) 
and 1913, 282,597. The contributions to the civil service due to agency growth were taken as the 
changes in  the total classified service from 1903 and  1909 and from  1909 and  1913, less the 
additions due to executive orders, as documented in U.S. House of Representatives (1976, 207, 
213). Agency growth includes the creation of  some new agencies, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration. The additions to the classified service through executive orders include actions 
taken by department heads and civil service rules revisions to extend the classified service during 
the Arthur, Cleveland, and first Roosevelt administrations. These were initiated by  the president. 
See, e.g., Sageser (1935, 62, 67, 103, 199) and U.S. House of Representatives (1976, 208-11). 
Total federal civilian employment is from U.S.  House of Representatives (1976, 305) for 1884 
(1885 isnotavailable), 1897, 1901, 1903,1909, 1913.Datafor  1889arefromSageser(1935, 107). 
“The remainder of McKinley’s term. 
in 1913, the number of available patronage slots had grown by only 78 percent 
from 104,956 to 187,282.16  Despite demands to reclassify some of  the merit 
service to satisfy calls for patronage from Democrats, there were no major 
reclassifications of positions under Wilson, and the merit share of the federal 
labor force continued to increase. Wilson did, however, attempt tightly to con- 
trol the assignment of the existing patronage slots by  personally supervising 
the selection of applicants for each position. The task was too much, and Wil- 
son was forced to delegate the responsibility of  selecting and monitoring pat- 
ronage assignments. This episode, like previous ones, illustrates the costs of 
managing an expanding patronage p001.l’ 
Table 3.1 outlines the increase in the classified service by  presidential ad- 
ministration between 1884 and 1913.18  The table documents the important role 
of the president in expanding the size of the merit system after 1884. Figures 
3.1 and 3.2 provide a longer-term perspective on the growth of the classified 
service. Figure 3.1 shows the expansion of  the total federal labor force and 
patronage positions over the period 1884-1940. Notice that the absolute num- 
ber of patronage employees (total civilian employment less merit employment) 
is relatively flat through 1917, suggesting that the president was comparatively 
successful in controlling the size of the patronage pool once the merit system 
was adopted. After the short blip that began in 1918, patronage levels remain 
steady and low through 1933, when they rise with the New Deal. Figure 3.2 
describes the ratio of  federal merit employment to total federal civilian em- 
ployment from 1884 to 1940, and it reveals the incremental, although relatively 
steep, increase in the proportion of merit employment through 1921, where the 
proportion levels at approximately 80 percent. The proportion drops during the 
1930s with the expansion of New Deal programs, which were often staffed by 
nonclassified employees. We consider this reversal when discussing the Hatch 
Act below. 
3.3.2  Lame-Duck Additions and Party Dominance 
Presidential executive orders to expand merit coverage could be used to ac- 
complish a variety of  objectives. The classification of  positions in particular 60  Chapter3 
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Fig. 3.1  Growth of total federal employment and patronage positions, 
188k1940. 
Sources: The data on total federal civilian employment and the number of federal employees in 
the competitive service (classified) are from U.S. House of Representatives (1976, 305). 
However, data on total federal civilian employees for the years 1885-90,  1896, 1898, 1900, and 
1902 were not reported. Estimates for these years were obtained using the Annual Reports of  the 
U.S. Civil Service commission. 
facilities or offices could improve productivity, and the qualitative evidence 
regarding the effects of the Pendleton Act presented in chapter 2 suggests that 
that was the case. Control of the number of patronage employees also gave the 
president greater power in negotiations with members of  Congress over the 
exchange of  appointments for support on policy issues. 
A more commonly asserted goal of presidential extensions was to “blanket 
in” existing federal employees, not only to protect them under merit rules, but 
also to deny their patronage positions to political competitors.” Initially, this 
practice may have been relatively difficult because, under early Civil Service 
rules, incumbents in positions that had been recently classified could obtain 
merit status only if they passed a merit test and because promotion often re- 
quired merit examinations.20  President Cleveland, however, modified the rules 
in February  1888 to waive the requirement of  merit testing of  incumbents.21 
Accordingly, a president could classify positions in order to grant merit status 
to patronage appointees. Certainly, this procedure would allow a president to 
“blanket in” employees known to be loyal to the administration. 
Although presidents did issue postelection executive orders to extend the 61  The Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees 
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Total Employees 
classified service, we  do not believe that this practice accounted for most of 
the growth of the merit system. Nor do we believe that blanketing in deserves 
as much emphasis as has been given to it in the historical literature. The focus 
on narrow partisan goals in extending the merit service diverts analysis from 
the fundamental problems facing the president in managing a large patronage 
labor force. There were a few dramatic cases of blanketing in, and these have 
received undue attention. We  have stressed the incentives of politicians, espe- 
cially those of the president, for limiting patronage. The analysis of voting on 
the Pendleton Act and the bipartisan rejection of efforts to repeal it indicate 
that the origins and extension of the merit service were due to factors beyond 
narrow, short-term partisan concerns with protecting party stalwarts. It is also 
important to note that, as discussed in more detail below, classified employees 
did not receive tenure under the terms of the Pendleton Act. Their positions 
could be declassifed, and they could be dismissed by the president. Substantial 
tenure protection did not come until after 1897. Hence, while postelection ap- 
pointments might have provided some security to party workers, there was no 
long-term  job guarantee once a new administration took office. At least at first, 
blanketing in certainly had the potential to be only temporary. 
In addition, attempting to protect against future policy reversals by keeping 
the “right people” in the bureaucracy  seemingly would have  entailed merit 
protection from the president for high-level administrative  positions. But merit 
status was not authorized by the Pendleton Act for the most senior officials in 
the bureaucracy. Finally, although the president was under intense pressure 
from party leaders to provide spoils, the White House typically resisted these 
1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 
Fig. 3.2  Proportion of merit to total federal civilian employees, 1884-1940. 
Sources: See fig. 3.1. 62  Chapter3 
demands whenever possible and delayed in responding to them. The president 
did not want to lose control of the administrative framework of his administra- 
tion to the spoils system. Indeed, a major aim of the president was to construct 
an  executive-centered government, by  controlling  the number of  patronage 
workers (Skowronek 1982, 180). 
The actions of President Cleveland are good examples of presidential inter- 
ests that were separate from those of  party officials at the local level and of 
resistance to pressure brought to bear by  members of  Congress. On gaining 
office in 1885, Cleveland moved slowly in responding to the demands of Dem- 
ocratic party leaders to increase the availability of  patronage appointments, 
preferring to meet and screen as many applicants as possible and thereby to 
maintain some control over the system. Further, his classification of 5,320 posi- 
tions in the Railway Mail Service on 31 December,  1888, as he was leaving 
office, was as much in response to past embarrassment to the presidency from 
corruption and mismanagement in the service as to demands from the party. 
Indeed, there were other demands to save more Democrats, but Cleveland did 
not react to them. As with President Arthur before him, Cleveland did not want 
to jeopardize the merit system with extensive postelection  expansions (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1976, 197). Moreover, with his administration on its 
way out of office, he could classify the Railway Mail Service and remove those 
positions from patronage access by local postmasters and other party officials, 
Democratic as well as Republican.**  This action would ultimately strengthen 
the hand of the president by  allowing him more control over federal workers 
and the administrative structure of the government. 
Similarly, in December  1908, when Roosevelt hit at the heart of the re- 
maining local patronage plums, fourth-class postmasterships, by placing them 
in the merit service, he did so in ways that added to presidential authority. He 
classifed 15,488 fourth-class postmasterships in fourteen states that had voted 
Republican in national contests in  1896, 1900, 1904, and  1908. These were 
in safe Republican areas, and their continuance as patronage served only to 
strengthen  local party officials and the members  of  Congress tied to them. 
They did  not  serve the president,  and they were  removed from patronage. 
Postal patronage for the remaining fourth-class postmasterships in areas that 
could be successfully contested by Democrats were retained by Roosevelt for 
use by the incoming Republican president Tafi. Taft classified 36,236 fourth- 
class postmasterships  later in his administration  (Skowronek  1982, 178-79; 
U.S. House of Representatives 1976, 207, 213). 
Nevertheless, claims have been made that, during their last year in office, 
presidents responded to the demands of party leaders to classify the party faith- 
ful before the next administration took office' and to reduce the ability of the 
incoming party to use those positions to generate political assessments (See 
Maranto and Schultz 1991,62; Van Riper 1958, 117-20;  U.S. House of Repre- 
sentatives 1976, 181-83). These have been referred to as "lame-duck" classifi- 
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Although postelection or lame-duck classifications were used from time to 
time in the first thirty years after the enactment of the Pendleton Act, the view 
that they were primarily a means by which presidents protected the party faith- 
ful  ignores  other,  more  critical  factors  in  the  growth  of  the  merit  system 
through executive orders. Generally, presidents appear to have used their au- 
thority to expand the classified service in order to enhance their authority and 
the effectiveness of the provision of government services to their national con- 
stituencies. In addition to being a response to more complex factors than is 
generally understood, lame-duck additions played a relatively smaller part in 
the overall development of the civil service system than is often believed. Con- 
sider the first thirty years of the merit service, when lame-duck classifications 
were most common. Table 3.2 describes the growth in the classifed service by 
presidential admistration from Arthur to Taft. As indicated in the table, lame- 
duck additions represented about 42 percent of all executive order classifica- 
tions during the period, and they accounted for only about 20 percent of the 
total growth in the  classified  service. As  the  classifed  service continued  to 
grow in numbers and as a proportion of the total federal labor force, lame-duck 
additions played an even smaller role. 
The conclusion that lame-duck additions did not play a dominant role in the 
expansion of the classifed service is further supported by regression analysis 
on the ratio of total classified to total federal civilian employees between 1884 
Table 3.2  Lame-Duck Additions to the Classified Service, 1884-1913 
President 
Change in Total  Additions Due to  Lame-Duck 
Classified Service  Exccutk Orders  Additions 
Arthur (R), 1881-85: 
Cleveland (D), 1885-89: 
Harrison (R), 1889-93: 
Cleveland (D), 1893-97: 
McKinley (R), 1897-1901: 
Roosevelt (R), 1901-3:d 
Roosevelt (R), 1903-9: 










1,449  1,200 
7,259  5,320 
8,690  7,924 
42.5 1  1  5,063 
1,715  ... 
8,391  ... 
21,583  15,780 
40,236  20,000 
282,597  13  1,834  55,287 
Sources and notes; Colcmn  1 is the change in total classified service from one administration to 
the next, taken from table 3. I.  Column 2 shows additions to the classified service through executive 
orders, taken from table 3.1. Column 3 shows lame-duck additions, which are those additions to 
the classified service made by the president from November of his last full year in office until the 
next March, when the new president assumed office. Lame-duck data are from Sageser (1935,69, 
106, 162, and 199) for the Arthur, Cleveland, and Harrison administrations. Lame-duck appoint- 
ments for the Roosevelt and Taft administrations arc from US. House of Representatives (1976, 
207,213, respectively). The 20,000 lame-duck additions shown for Taft were not additions to the 
total classified service since they had been given limited coverage earlier by Roosevelt. Taft placed 
them within the competitive, merit service (U.S. House of Representatives 1976,213). 
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and  1940, when the modern civil service system was basically put in place. 
Because the problems of monitoring  and controlling patronage workers are 
hypothesized to be linked to the size of the federal labor force, we expect that 
the ratio of merit to total employment will increase as the federal labor force 
expands (see app. B). Indeed, the classified service grew from 13,208 in 1883 
to 726,827 in 1940, and, as shown in fig. 3.2 above, the proportion of classifed 
to total federal civilian employment increased rapidly. Table 3.3 describes re- 
gression results using the ratio of classified to total federal employees as the 
dependent variable. Since the ratio of merit to total employment cannot exceed 
unity, the specification is nonlinear, and we allow for a flexible functional form 
by including total employment, total employment squared, and total employ- 
ment raised to the third power. The results reported for equation (1) reveal a 
close fit between the merit ratio and the total employment variables, with the 
merit proportion rising with increases in overall federal employment. While, 
given the plot in figure 3.2, this result is to be expected this specification makes 
it possible to do more to examine lame-duck appointments as an alternative 
explanation for the growth of the merit service. 
Equations (2) and (3) in table 3.3 add variables to analyze the contribution 
of lame-duck additions to the growth of the classified service that are so em- 
phasized in the literature. To test for the effects of these actions, we offer two 
additional specifications. In the first, three dummy variables that correspond 
to the first, second, and third years of each presidential term are included. The 
fourth year is the excluded category. If “blanketing-in frequently occurred near 
the end of  an  Administration”  (U.S. House of  Representatives  1976, 183), 
the three dummy variables should be significantly negative. The second spec- 
ification  focuses  exclusively  on  the  propensity  of  a  lame-duck  president 
about to be replaced by a member of the opposite party to blanket in patronage 
workers. Since presidential  elections were held  in the month of  November 
and newly elected presidents took office the following year, a dummy vari- 
able was constructed that took  the value of  unity for both the year of  the 
presidential  election  and  the  year  immediately  following  a  switch  in  the 
party controlling the White House. There were  seven such switches in our 
data set. 
Also included in these regression runs is a dummy variable to account for 
those situations when the majority party in the Senate and that in the House 
were the same as that of the president.  If  the shift to merit were strictly a 
partisan issue, as opposed to one involving the problems of labor management 
and control emphasized here, then, whenever a political party dominated both 
branches of government, there should be less incentive for the president and 
the Congress to give up patronage. This argument suggests that classifications 
would be more likely when political power was more evenly distributed or, 
alternatively, that when a party controlled both the presidency and the Con- 
gress, the use of patronage should increase.23 65  The Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees 
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Sources and notes: Data on total federal civilian employment and merit employment are taken 
from the sources listed for fig. 3.1. Party affiliation and election data are from U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1975, 1083). For discussion of the variables, see the text. The equations were esti- 
mated using a second-order autocorrelation error model and an iterative Cochrane-Orcutt proce- 
dure. Minus 2 times the log of the likelihood ratio for the restricted eq. (1) and the unrestricted eq. 
(2) is 4.79. With four restrictions, the critical value of the x2  distribution at the 90 percent level is 
7.78. In contrast, minus 2 times the log of the likelihood ratio for eq. (I) and (3) is 4.72. With only 
two restrictions, the critical value of the x2  distribution is 4.6. r-ratios in parentheses. 
The results reported for equation (2)  of table 3.3 do not reveal any convinc- 
ing evidence of a cycle in the growth of the ratio of merit to total employees. 
Moreover, the coefficient on the party dominance variable is not significantly 
different from zero. A likelihood ratio test, reported in the table, leads to a 
strong rejection of the hypothesis that these political variables are jointly sig- 
nificant and that they can explain the long-term shift to a merit system. The 
results reported for equation (3), however, suggest a tendency for lame-duck 
presidents to increase the proportion of merit to total federal employment fol- 
lowing a victory by the opposing party. Although the coefficient on the variable 
representing the presence of  a lame-duck president is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level, the magnitude is relatively small, only .02. This coeffi- 
cient can be interpreted as follows. Between 1884 and 1940, the ratio of merit 
to total federal employment went from .10 to .73. Assuming that blanketing in 
was permanent, then the seven incidents of lame-duck extensions accounted 
for no more than .14 (7 X .02) of the total increase in the ratio of .63, or about 66  Chapter3 
22 percent of the growth of the merit portion of the labor force.24  While lame- 
duck presidential appointments were made, the results presented here suggest 
that such actions played a smaller role in the shift from patronage to merit 
than has been emphasized in the historical literature. The lack of  statistical 
significance for the party dominance variables in equations (2) and (3) also 
supports our general argument. The need to develop an institution to address 
the growing problems of  controlling and managing the federal labor force, 
rather than short-term partisan interests, was the dominant force behind the 
adoption and extension of the merit service. 
3.4  The Addition of Tenure Provisions 
The Pendleton Act institutionalized the use of competitive examinations to 
improve the quality of the federal workforce in specific areas, and the gradual 
reduction in the relative number of patronage employees reduced the influence 
of  local party officials over federal workers. Further, the exam requirement 
limited political discretion in placement, but the law did not provide for tenure 
for federal employees. The only explicit job-security protection granted classi- 
fed employees under the Pendleton Act was that “no person in the public ser- 
vice is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, 
or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise 
prejudiced for refusing to do so” (sec.  13). As Paul Van  Riper pointed out, 
“Both the original civil service reformers and many subsequent American leg- 
islators have consistently fought against an overly absolute tenure as undesir- 
able and unnecessary for civil service reform” (1958, 101). Accordingly, the 
preiident’s power to remove workers remained essentially intact for both the 
new classified service and the patronage positions. 
Nevertheless, soon after the Pendleton Act was enacted, the president and 
the Congress, with a collective stake in the maintenance of the merit system, 
found that they could not just remove political considerations in hiring deci- 
sions but had to address removals as well. The political temptations would be 
great if the president could simply declassify positions, remove officeholders, 
and replace them with patronage employees. So long as it was easy to declas- 
sify positions, the president would be subject to demands from Congress and 
other party officials to expand patronage. The effectiveness of the merit service 
in limiting the number of patronage workers, then, depended on adjustments 
to the civil service system to provide protection against arbitrary removal. 
3.4.1  McKinley’s Executive Order 
The first significant move toward tenure provisions was made by President 
McKinley in  1897. McKinley  was under intense pressure  from Republican 
party officials and some Republican members of Congress to reclassify  the 
positions added by Democratic president Cleveland. Cleveland had added over 
42,000 positions to the classifed service through executive orders. Had McKin- 67  The Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees 
ley responded and declassified the positions, the merit system would have suf- 
fered a major setback, and efforts to control the number of patronage workers 
would have been compromised. 
The merit system was especially valuable to the president, and wholesale 
declassifications of positions were resisted. Although McKinley did declassify 
approximately 9,000 positions in  response to party demands, his action af- 
fected fewer than a fourth of  Cleveland’s additions to the classified service. 
Moreover, and more significant for the development of the federal civil service, 
McKinley issued an executive order on 27 July  1897, which became part of 
the Civil Service Rules, prohibiting removal from the classifed service except 
for just cause, with written notification and an  opportunity to respond: “No 
removal shall be made from any position subject to competitive examination 
except for just cause and upon written charges filed with the head of the De- 
partment or other appointing officer, and of which the accused shall have full 
notice and an opportunity to make defense” (U.S. Civil Service Commission, 
Annual Report, 1897, 19). 
Enforcement was left to the president, and this was the beginning of tenure 
provisions for federal employees. Under the new rule, the originating depart- 
ment was required to forward copies of the charges behind a planned dismissal 
along with the employee’s response to the Civil Service Commission for review 
and recording. The Civil Service Commission called the requirement one of 
the most important rules ever issued relating to the classified service. Its re- 
strictions on removal, including requirements that the reasons for dismissal be 
made public, were upheld early in the courts. The commission stated that the 
rule “lessens the temptation to make improper removals, and affords a just 
degree of protection to the faithful and efficient employees” (US. Civil Service 
Commission, Annual Report, 1897,20). 
3.4.2  The Lloyd-LaFollette Act 
Once a merit  system for classified employees was  established, there re- 
mained the problem of whether the president or the Congress were to have 
direct control over these employees. With the decline in the number of patron- 
age positions relative to total federal civilian employment, conflict between 
the president and the Congress over the federal workforce and the associated 
administration of government services shifted from patronage to the classified 
service. This became most  apparent after Roosevelt replaced McKinley as 
president in 1901, when the classified service accounted for over 40 percent of 
the federal civilian labor force. Roosevelt sought to gain control of  the merit 
civil service by attempting to sever ties between classified employees and offi- 
cials outside the executive branch. In  1901, he ordered the Treasury Depart- 
ment to withhold the salary of  any classified employee whose appointment 
violated civil service rules as a patronage assignment. Such assignments were 
most likely made by or on behalf of members of  Congress (Skowronek 1982, 
179). In addition, beginning in 1902, Roosevelt, and later Taft, issued so-called 68  Chapter3 
gag orders that forbade federal employees, “either directly or indirectly, indi- 
vidually or through association, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence in 
their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before Congress or its 
committees, or in any way  save through the heads of the Departments in or 
under which they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service” 
(Spero 1927,96). 
The enforcement of McKinley’s earlier executive order regarding arbitrary 
dismissals rested with the president, so the threat to remove those employees 
who maintained direct ties to Congress rather than going through their depart- 
ment heads was a real one. Under the gag orders, federal employees were to 
convey their desires only  through  department officials,  who  had  been  ap- 
pointed by  the president. Although the immediate issue involved efforts by 
federal employees to form unions to lobby for pay  increases, the concern in 
Congress went beyond unionization or salaries for government workers. Con- 
gress saw the gag orders as an assertion of  presidential control over federal 
employees, with noncompliance penalized by dismissal. In response, in 19  12 
Congress passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act (37 Stat. 553,  which allowed fed- 
eral employees to petition individually or collectively to join labor organiza- 
tions that did not authorize the use of strikes. Importantly, the act strengthened 
McKinley’s 1897 executive order by prohibiting the dismissal of classified em- 
ployees for any reason, except efficiency, and by requiring that written notice 
of possible dismissal be issued and that the employee have the opportunity to 
respond (Spero 1927, 168). 
3.4.3  Other Legislation Affecting Tenure 
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act also demonstrates the rise of federal employees 
as an influential lobby group in  molding civil service rules in  their behalf 
through legislation. More ironclad tenure provisions were added in the Civil 
Service Retirement Act  (41 Stat. 614) of  1920. Further tenure provisions, 
which raised the costs of  dismissal by  outlining elaborate grievance proce- 
dures, were added in the Classification Acts of  1923 and 1949 and the Civil 
Service Reform Act of  1978 (42 Stat. 1488, 63 Stat. 954, and 92 Stat. 1111, 
respectively). 
Under current civil service provisions, career federal employees, particu- 
larly the rank and file, have tenured employment. Indeed, job tenure is a key 
characteristic of the federal civil service system. The degree of job tenure that 
now exists appears to go beyond that which would have been sought by  the 
president and the Congress to maintain the integrity of  the merit system. All 
that would have been necessary to reduce the temptation to fire and reclassify 
merit employees for patronage purposes was a provision to prevent arbitrary 
dismissal, along with a process for appeals and review. The tenure guarantees 
that exist, however, exceed these requirements. Under civil service rules, it is 
very costly for supervisors to remove employees, and even reductions in force 
(RIFs), such as those implemented in the early 1980s, do not lead to any sig- 
nificant numbers of involuntary separations from the federal service (Johnson 69  The Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees 
and Libecap 1989b). To understand the degree of tenure guarantees that exist 
today requires consideration of the role of  federal employee groups in influ- 
encing legislation regarding the civil service system. This important phenome- 
non  in the process of  institutional change is addressed in  more detail in the 
following chapters. 
3.5  Political Neutrality 
Three fundamental characteristics of the federal civil service are that it cov- 
ers most federal civilian employees, that classified employees essentially have 
job tenure, and that classified employees are restricted in the types of political 
activities in which they  may  engage. We  have argued that extension of  the 
classified service and tenure protections were the outcome of conscious efforts 
by the president, and to a lesser degree the Congress, to control the number of 
patronage appointments, to provide government services for influential constit- 
uents, and to limit opportunistic manipulation of  federal employees. In this 
section, we argue that requirements for political neutrality were also necessary 
to reduce the value of federal workers as pure political assets for which local 
politicians, the president, and Congress could compete. 
Merit achievement in testing for hiring and promotion, as required by the 
Pendleton Act, in itself implied some measure of political neutrality. Knowl- 
edge and skill were to replace political loyalty as conditions for employment 
and advancement. Additionally, the Pendleton Act’s prohibition of political as- 
sessments and subsequent restrictions on arbitrary removal for purely partisan 
reasons, granted by McKinley’s executive order and by  the Lloyd-LaFollette 
Act, provided further distance between classified federal workers and party 
demands. But classified employees remained free to engage in political activi- 
ties on their own accord. As long as government workers could participate 
in campaigns, they remained potentially valuable political assets, encouraging 
competition among the president and members of Congress for their control 
and partisan use. Both the president and the Congress could attempt to elicit 
campaign support from federal employees by promising them promotions and 
other benefits. Detecting this sort of quid pro quo behavior would be costly, 
and, if extensive, it posed a threat to the basic separation between the classified 
service and patr~nage.~~  Restricting the types of political activities in which 
federal workers could engage, however, could sufficiently reduce their value 
as political assets and, hence, reduce the incentives to compete for control 
over them. 
As  was the case with the extension of  the merit system, the early moves 
toward requiring political neutrality came from the president.26  In an executive 
order on 14 July 1888, President Cleveland prohibited the use of government 
offices for political purposes that  interfered with public  duties (Van Riper 
1958, 187). Recall that Cleveland was under pressure, not only from Republi- 
cans in Congress, but also from members of his own party, who sought control 
over federal employees, merit and unclassified alike. Cleveland’s executive or- 70  Chapter3 
der, however, could not be effectively enforced, in part because it made no 
distinction between the classified and the unclassified labor forces. 
President Theodore Roosevelt again attempted to impose political neutrality 
on the federal labor force in his efforts to strengthen the president’s authority 
relative to Congress. In 1902, he redefined political neutrality for unclassified 
employees by  prohibiting the use of  administrative offices for political pur- 
poses or to cause public scandal (Skowronek 1982, 179-80;  Van Riper 1958, 
187-203). Again, the president was concerned about the reputation of the ad- 
ministration. For classified employees, the neutrality requirement included the 
strict prohibition  of  all political  activity. President  Roosevelt’s proscription 
against political activity became formally known as Civil Service Rule I and 
reads as follows: 
No person in the executive civil service shall use his official authority or 
influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the re- 
sult thereof. Persons who by the provision of these rules are in the competi- 
tive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to 
express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take no active 
part in political management or in political campaigns. (U.S. Civil Service 
Commission, Annual Report, 1908, 104) 
Although the president took the lead in advancing the merit system, the ex- 
change of patronage employees with members of Congress remained a means 
of obtaining votes on various bills. The temptation to expand patronage ap- 
pears to have been particularly  strong during the administration of Franklin 
Roosevelt. Not only was there an extensive and often controversial New Deal 
legislative agenda that required congressional support, but the Dzpression was 
in full swing, bringing pressure from local constituents on members of  Con- 
gress for government  A resurgence in the spoils system resulted in the 
early 1930s. 
During the first Roosevelt  administration,  over sixty New Deal  agencies 
were created and largely staffed outside the civil service system. Emphasis was 
placed on rapidly developing the agencies beyond the more cumbersome civil 
service procedures, and a premium was placed on obtaining employees who 
would be committed to the president’s policy agenda. Many of the appointees 
were pure patronage workers, designed to build political support for the New 
Deal and the politicians who sponsored them. As figure 3.2 points out, during 
this time the proportion  of  merit workers within the overall federal civilian 
labor force declined from 80 percent in 1932 to a low of 60 percent in 1936. 
This change was the result of  a 41 percent increase in total federal civilian 
employment, with only a modest increase in the number of employees within 
the classified service. By 1936, there were over 300,000 patronage positions 
available for distribution, more than at any other time in the nation’s history 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1976, 305). 
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by 1935 had exempted most New Deal agencies from merit system regulations 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1976, 254). With the expansion of patronage, 
however, came efforts by the president to distribute and use federal employees 
to defeat unsupportive congressional politicians and governors. In 1938, Roo- 
sevelt campaigned for Senator Alben Barkely of Kentucky against Governor 
A. B. Happy Chandler. Further, in 1938, Roosevelt attempted to purge mem- 
bers of Congress who did not support his programs (Van Riper  1958, 340). 
Patronage allotments were a major tool for rewarding and punishing candi- 
dates. These actions reduced congressional support for an expanded patronage 
labor force that was primarily available for political use by the president. 
Both the president and the Congress, however, had another and more funda- 
mental reason for being concerned about the actions of patronage workers dur- 
ing the New Deal. As had occurred previously, the large number of patronage 
positions presented the president and the Congress with the problem of manag- 
ing their appointees. Patronage workers were often under the influence of local 
party or agency officials, whose actions were only loosely controlled by na- 
tional politicians. This created an environment for potential embarrassment for 
the president and the Congress if their appointees were involved in scandals or 
used in ways that harmed influential constituents. 
The experience at the Works Progress Administration  (WPA) is a case in 
point. Most WPA officials at the field level were far removed from supervision 
by elected officials in Washington, D.C. WPA workers, dependent on federal 
employment during the Depression, were vulnerable to political assessments 
and other forms of extortion, and such actions appear to have been widespread 
(See Congrepional Record, 76th Cong.,  1st sess., 20 July  1939, pp. 9594- 
9640). Workers were required to make contributions to their project supervi- 
sor, and there was little accounting as to the end use of the funds, This form of 
political extortion of those who could least afford to pay generated a consider- 
able amount of  bad publicity for both the Congress and the president.28  The 
sense that there was a problem controlling the vast number of patronage work- 
ers created by New Deal programs may well have induced the president, fol- 
lowing the election of  1936, to move positions  and agencies into the merit 
system. The proportion of federal employees covered under the classified sys- 
tem began to increase after 1936. Once classified, former patronage employees 
were less likely to be of value to local party officials, and there were explicit 
civil service rules prohibiting  political assessments and threats of  dismissal 
for failure to engage in campaign activities. Hence, classification reduced the 
chances for the types of scandals that occurred within the WPA. Nevertheless, 
the episode demonstrates the problems encountered in controlling a large pat- 
ronage workforce and indicates that further constraints on the behavior of the 
president and the Congress would be required if  costly competition over the 
control and use of federal employees were to be avoided. 
The Hatch Acts of 1939 and 1940 (53 Stat. 1147 and 54 Stat. 767, respec- 
tively), which formalized the requirement for political neutrality, were the out- 72  Chapter3 
come of these concerns. The Hatch Acts restricted federal workers (both classi- 
fied and unclassified)  and state and local employees funded by federal grants 
from engaging in direct political  activitie~.~~  Exemptions were made for per- 
sons paid  from appropriations for the Office of  the President and for those 
appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate who were to be en- 
gaged in determining policy. All other government employees covered by the 
sweeping provisions of the Hatch Acts were prohibited from taking an active 
part in  political  management or political  campaigns. Violation  would  bring 
immediate dismissal. Previously, the Civil Service Commission had discretion 
in determining punishment for the violation of civil service rules, such as Rule 
I, which had restricted direct campaign efforts by classified employees. Under 
the new laws, the discretion for punishing violations of  prohibitions against 
political activities was removed. The Hatch Acts represent the capstone in the 
movement from open patronage conditions that existed in the 1880s to an insu- 
lated and, ostensibly, politically neutral civil service. 
3.6  Summary 
This chapter has outlined how the incentives of the president and the Con- 
gress to control federal employees after 1883 led to conscious efforts by both 
parties  to expand the  merit system. Most of these extensions were through 
executive orders issued by the president or the revision of civil service rules to 
broaden coverage to new facilities. But extending the merit-testing framework 
adopted in 1883 under the Pendleton Act was not enough; the original act did 
not close important margins through which elected officials could still seek to 
mdnipulate federal workers for narrow partisan purposes. So long as govern- 
ment employees remained  vulnerable to the threat of  removal for failure to 
respond to these demands, and so long as classified positions could be declassi- 
fied and returned to patronage, the merit system remained unstable. Under con- 
ditions of  intense political  pressure on  the president from local party leaders 
and certain members of Congress, the system could have unraveled. The presi- 
dent, the most national of all politicians and the one with the most to gain from 
the retention of merit rules, was the first to act on the tenure issue. McKinley 
issued his exective order in 1897 outlining tenure conditions and appeals pro- 
cesses. McKinley’s actions were taken to head off demands from Congress for 
greater partisan  use of the growing classified service. Congress’s turn on the 
issue came fifteen years later with the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. In this case, the 
Congress was responding to efforts by the president to obtain additional parti- 
san control of the classified service. With job tenure and an elaborate appeals 
process established over time, the threat of dismissal was no longer a credible 
one to be used by politicians seeking to influence the behavior of federal em- 
ployees. 
Besides tenure, the requirement for political neutrality by federal employees 
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ees. As with tenure, it is hard to imagine a greater shift from old patronage 
practices than the notion of ordering political neutrality for government work- 
ers. Yet this was what was required to reduce the value of federal workers as 
partisan  assets, subject to competitive control by  the president and the Con- 
gress. Again, the president was the first to act on the issue. Cleveland attempted 
to instill political neutrality as a condition for all government employees, clas- 
sified and patronage alike, in  1888. At that time, Cleveland was in a fervent 
battle with members of his party and with Republicans in Congress over fed- 
eral workers. Theodore  Roosevelt followed with another executive order for 
political neutrality for federal employees in  1902, when he outlined separate 
requirements for merit and unclassified  employees. Congress completed the 
process by  placing  all rank-and-file  federal  workers  outside  direct political 
campaigns with the Hatch Acts of  1939 and 1940. 
With the extension of the civil service system to include most federal civil- 
ian employees, and with the additions of  rules providing for job tenure and 
compelling political neutrality, the fundamental characteristics of the modem 
civil service institution were put into place. We argue that this process of insti- 
tutional change was the outcome of actions taken by vote-maximizing politi- 
cians, the president and the Congress, to place federal employees off limits to 
costly competition for control. Neither party could unilaterally withdraw from 
the competitive fray for patronage. Hence, rule changes taken at the behest of 
both parties were necessary to create an institutional structure that would allow 
the president and the Congress jointly to withdraw from contention over the 
federal labor force and to allow federal workers to focus on the delivery of 
government services. 
Although the actions taken by  the president and the Congress account for 
the origins and much of the basic structure of the federal civil service system, 
a third party, federal employees, became an important factor in the further de- 
velopment of the system. We argue that, through their efforts, additional pro- 
visions were placed into the civil service system that went beyond those that 
would be strictly desired by the president or the Congress. This phenomenon 
became more pronounced as the twentieth century progressed, and it is the 
subject of the following chapter. 
Notes 
1. Maranto and Schultz (1991,44) make the argument that civil service reform had 
both a moral basis and an emphasis on short-term political gains (see also Van Riper 
1958, 85). 
2. The blanketing-in hypothesis continues to be advanced as the primary explana- 
tion for the growth of  the civil service even in the more recent literature (see, e.g., 
Maranto and Schultz 1991, 51). 74  Chapter3 
3. The traditional view is expressed by  Hoogenboom: “Those who opposed spoils 
were usually out of power, but once these ‘outs’ were ‘in’ the evils of the system seemed 
to vanish” (1  968, 7). 
4. Recall that the coefficient on the variable Democrat shown in table 2.3 was nega- 
tive and significant. 
5. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Pendleton Act. Van  Riper (1958, 104, 138) discusses 
the establishment of local boards, noting that, between 1884 and 1888, a “Rule of Four” 
was used. 
6. See Van Riper (1958, 101). There was considerable discussion during the debate 
on the Pendleton Act in both the House and the Senate over whether the act would 
extend tenure to newly covered workers. This prompted Senator Pendleton to explain, 
“The bill does not touch the question of tenure of office or of removal from office. I 
see it  stated by  those who do not know that it provides for a seven years’ tenure in 
office. There is noting like it in the bill. I see it stated that it provides for removals from 
office. There is nothing like it in the bill. Whether or not it would be advisable to limit 
removals are questions about which men will differ; but the bill as it is and as we invoke 
the judgement of the Senate upon it contains no provision either as to tenure of office 
or removals from office. It leaves these questions exactly as the law now finds them” 
(Congressional Record, 47th Cong. 2d sess., 12 December 1882,207). 
7. For a discussion of the development of these rules and how they relate to the 
Hatch Acts of  1939 and 1940, see Eccles (1981,20-30). 
8. For the debate on repeal, see Congressional Record, 49th Cong.,  1st sess., pp. 
401,2287,2945-52,  and for the vote on S. 839, which called for a repeal of the Pendle- 
ton Act, see p. 5852. 
9. Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5852. In the Senate, 56 percent 
of the Democrats abstained from the vote. 
10. Some constitutional issues were raised by these and other provisions of the Pen- 
dleton Act. Since the law authorized the Civil Service Commission to select employees 
on the basis of  competitive exams, there was some question as to whether that was 
an +unconstitutional  invasion of  the powers of the president and the Congress. See the 
discussion in Van Riper (1958, 105-8). 
11. Goldstein and Weingast (1991) also argue that the delegation of policy-making 
authority to the president reflects a desire on the part of the Congress to guard against 
later reversals. 
12. For the Forty-seventh Congress, Republicans held 147 seats and Democrats 135 
in the House, and each party held thirty-seven seats in the Senate (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1975, 1083). 
13. There are other instances in which the existence of significant externalities has 
led the Congress to delegate authority to the president. See, e.g., Lohmann and O’Hal- 
loran’s (1  992) explanation for why Congress delegated trade policy-making authority 
to the president. 
14. Congress did make minor additions to the classified service starting in 1903 (see 
Sageser  1935, 231; and US. House of  Representatives  1976, 310). It was not until 
1935 that congressional legislation regarding the Soil Conservation Service added a 
significant number of positions to the classified service. 
15. Through the longer period 1884-1913,  approximately 47 percent of the growth 
of the merit service was through executive orders. 
16. U.S. House of Representatives (1976, 305). Patronage positions were calculated 
as the difference between total federal civilian employment and the classified labor 
force for 1897 and 191  3 as listed in table 3.1. 
17. For a discussion of Wilson’s effort to monitor the assignment of patronage, see 
Van Riper (1958, 232-35). 75  The Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees 
18. As indicated in the note to table 3.1, the data are collected from a variety of 
sources. Most reflect revisions of  Sageser’s data by  Skowronek. These sources were 
used to decompose the contributions of agency growth and executive orders to the over- 
all growth of the classified service. In our figures and statistical work, where longer- 
term time series are involved, we have used the data in U.S.  House of Representatives 
(1976, 305), which cover 1884-1975.  These data do not identify the sources of  the 
growth of  the classified service. Although the data generally agree, there are small 
differences between some of  the figures reported in table 3.1  and those in  the U.S. 
House report. 
19. For a discussion of the “blanketing-in” process, see U.S. House of  Representa- 
tives (1976, 182-83) and Heclo (1977,41). 
20. For the variety of rules regarding merit status, examination, and promotion that 
existed in the early civil service, see U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report 
(1888, 73-92).  Gradually, these were standardized so that examinations were required 
for merit status and promotion. 
21. U.S. House of  Representatives (1976, 182). Later, the examination requirement 
for merit status was reinstated. 
22. Harrison followed a similar practice in late 1892, when he extended classification 
to rural free delivery post offices. These positions had been bastions of patronage for 
local postmasters, and, once classified, they were no longer available for later patron- 
age assignment. 
23. This has been a popular argument. See, e.g., the analysis offered by  Geddes 
(1991). In addition to the results reported here, we also constructed and tested other 
measures of party dominance. For example, two variables, one measuring the percent- 
age of members of the Senate who were of the same party as the president and a similar 
measure for the House, were constructed. The results, however, were qualitatively the 
same as those reported in the text. Party dominance does not appear to have  had  a 
measurable effect on the development of the merit system. See also the discussion in 
Johnson and Libecap (1994). 
24. Assuming that blanketing in was permanent suggests an alternative specification. 
For each of the seven incidents of a lame-duck president, a variable was constructed 
that was set equal to unity starting with the president’s final year in office and remaining 
so until the end of the sample period, 1940. Although most of the coefficients on these 
seven variables were not significantly different from zero, the sum of their values was 
.12, supporting the result reported in the text. Moreover, the magnitude and level of 
significance of total federal employment variables remained essentially the same. 
25. The problems of  detection and policing that this posed  for the president and 
members of Congress are similar to that of controlling cheating within a cartel. 
26. President Theodore Roosevelt, in particular, appears to have been concerned with 
the political activity of federal workers (see Eccles 1981, 26). 
27. Van Riper (1958,320). Within the context of the model presented in app. B, these 
pressures would manifest themselves as increases in the demand for patronage. 
28. Congressman Taylor of  Tennessee reported that WPA workers had often been 
requested to contribute $5.00 per month when their entire monthly salary was only 
$30.00. This prompted the Knoxville News-Sentinel  to state, “The political racket in 
Tennessee is enough to sicken any decent human being, and it is doubly sickening when 
worked on helpless relief clients” (Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 20 July 
1939, p. 9598; see also Van Riper 1958, 340). 
29. For discussion of the Hatch Acts, see Eccles (1981). 